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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

This is a medical malpractice case in which the Plaintiffs alleged an emergency room
doctor was liable for wrongful death because the decedent suffered a fatal heart attack before he
could receive a follow-up appointment with a cardiologist.
B. Course of Proceedings Below

On June 10, 2013, Barbara Morrison filed a Verified Complaint for Wrongful Death on
behalf of herself and her two

children, G.M. and K.M. ("Plaintiffs"), against St. Luke's

Regional Medical Center, Ltd. ("St. Luke's") and Joachim G. Franklin, M.D. ("Dr. Franklin").
(R. 27). Plaintiffs alleged that St. Luke's and Dr. Franklin breached the standard of care by
failing to facilitate and ensure that Barbara's husband, Mitchell Morrison, received an expedited
appointment with a cardiologist after he presented to the ER with complaints of repeated and
severe chest pain. (R. 28-30). Plaintiffs also alleged that St. Luke's was vicariously liable for
Dr. Franklin's negligence under the doctrine of apparent agency. (R. 31 ). On December 23, 2013,
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Wrongful Death against Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A.
("EMI") alleging it was also negligent for failing to ensure Mr. Morrison was seen by a
cardiologist and that it was also vicariously liable for Dr. Franklin's negligence under the
doctrine ofrespondeat superior. (R. 1676-1681). The two cases were consolidated on February 5,
2014. (R. 71-73).

St. Luke's filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of any direct
claims that it was negligent, which was granted on June 30, 2014. (R. 1107-1109). Plaintiffs did
not appeal this Order.
EMI also filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of any direct
claims that it was negligent, which was granted on July 15, 2014. (R. 1327-1336). This Order is
at issue on appeal.
The case proceeded to trial on August 11, 2014, and the jury rendered a verdict for the
defense. (R. 1563-1565). Judgment was entered in favor of the Defendants on September 20,
2014. (R. 1566-1567). Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial on September 24, 2014. (R. 24).
However, Plaintiffs withdrew that motion on October 17, 2014. (R. 25). Plaintiffs filed their
Notice of Appeal on October 20, 2014 (R. 1643-1650), and an Amended Notice of Appeal on
October 30, 2014 (R. 1651-1658).
C. Statement of Facts
On December 26, 2011, Mitchell Morrison went to the St. Luke's Meridian Medical
Center complaining of three episodes of chest pain. (R. 1328; Trial Ex. 1, p. 1-2). He was seen
by Dr. Franklin, a board-certified emergency room physician employed by EMI. (R. 1328). EMI
has a contract to provide emergency services for St. Luke's at both the Boise and Meridian
locations. Id. Dr. Franklin ordered diagnostic tests. All tests were essentially normal. (Trial
Ex. 1, p. 3-9). Dr. Franklin concluded that Mr. Morrison was not experiencing a heart attack.
(R. 1328; Triai Ex. i, p. 9). Nevertheiess, Dr. Franklin advised the Morrisons to contact Dr. Fry,

a St. Luke's cardiologist, the following morning. (R. 1328; Trial Ex. 1, p. 10-11). When the
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Morrisons called the next morning to schedule an appointment with Dr. Fry, they were told that
the first available appointment was three weeks out. (R. 1328; Tr. p. 1009, L. 13 - p. 1010,
L. 20).

On January 11, 2012, before his appointment with Dr. Fry, Mr. Morrison, while at the
golf course, suffered a sudden heart attack and died. (R. 1329; Tr. p. 1013, L. 9-25). An autopsy
showed Mr. Morrison had advanced coronary disease. (R. 1329).

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Is St. Luke's Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal?

III.

ARGUMENT

A. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting EMI's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

St. Luke's joins in and adopts the arguments on this issue set forth in EMI and
Dr. Franklin's Brief.
B. Plaintiffs Have Waived Their Remaining Issues by Failing to Comply with Idaho

Appellate Rule 35(a)(6)
1. Evidence of a settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and EMI and Dr. Franklin
A party may only appeal from a final judgment, order, or decree. I.A.R. 4, 11;
I.R.C.P. 54(a). Plaintiffs fail to identify the final judgment, order, or decree from which they
appeal on this issue. Instead, they improperly invite this Court to engage in an independent
analysis of whether a settlement actually existed. However, Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6)
requires an appellant's argument to "contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and

3

parts of the transcript and record relied upon." Yet, there is no citation to the record for many of
the alleged contentions, and there is no argument or supporting authority as to why the alleged
contentions equate to a binding settlement agreement, constitute grounds for a new trial, or show
the court erred. This Court has recently reiterated the standards used when determining whether
to consider issues raised on appeal:
We will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and authority in the
opening brief" Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454
(2008); see also Idaho App. R., 35(a)(6) ("The argument shall contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the
reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript
and the record relied upon."). Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth
in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in
passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be
considered by this Court. lnarna v. Boise County ex rel. Bd of Comrn'rs, 138
Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003) (refusing to address a constitutional
takings issue when the issue was not supported by legal authority and was only
mentioned in passing).
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and
to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too
indefinite to be heard by the Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d
65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district
court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to
preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442,445,263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953).
This Court will not search the record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of
Prof'! Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to
the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in compliance
with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. lVix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117
P.3d 120, 122 (2005).
Bettweiser v. l'lew York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idai'lo 317, 323, 297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013)

(emphasis added) (quoting Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010).
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While Plaintiffs' briefing contains some citations to the record 1, it is entirely void of
citations to authority and contains mostly conclusory statements. "A party waives an issue cited
on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking." Bolognese v.

Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Zichko,
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)). There is no argument regarding the judgment,
order, or decree from which Plaintiffs appeal or the standard of review applicable to the district
court's alleged error. There is no cogent argument as to why the court's actions constitute an
abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs' argument is nothing more than a general attack on the court's
findings and conclusions that a settlement did not exist without references to any specific
evidentiary or legal errors.
Additionally, "because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed error affected a
substantial right, the appellant must present some argument that a substantial right was
implicated." Id. (quoting Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 420
(2012)). Plaintiffs do not present any argument that a substantial right was violated. They do not
argue that they would have been able to introduce additional evidence or that St. Luke's would
not have been able to introduce the same evidence had the trial been conducted differently. Their
only argument is that their case would have been opposed by only one law firm instead of two.
However, being opposed by only law firm is not a substantial right. Accordingly, Plaintiffs'
argument is too indefinite to be heard and should be deemed waived.

Some of the citations are to parts of the record that were not before the court, and not considered, at the time it
made its decision regarding the alleged settlement, such as the emails (R. 1454-1456), the affidavit of counsel
(R. 1496), and the Offer of Judgment and Judgment attached to Plaintiffs' Brief as Appendix Exhibit A.
1
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2. Objection related to defense proceedings
Plaintiffs likewise failed to adequately assert this issue with particularity and support.
Plaintiffs argue that the court summarily denied their Motion for Limitation of Defense
Proceedings and subsequent motions for mistrial. Plaintiffs' Motion for Limitation of Defense
Proceedings sought an order requiring the Defendants to select one attorney to conduct each
phase of the trial, i.e. voir dire, opening statements, etc. The only authority Plaintiffs cite to in
their brief for support is Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. However, Rule 403 governs the
admissibility of relevant evidence, not courtroom procedures. Plaintiffs do not explain or argue
how the court violated Rule 403 when it denied their motion. Instead, they move straight into
arguing that the court denied their motion to limit duplicative expert witnesses without any
evaluation. However, Plaintiffs fail to argue how these expert witnesses are related to the issue
on appeal, which is the objection to defense proceedings. These are two separate issues.
Furthermore, the only citation to the record with respect to the expert witnesses was a citation to
the first page in the transcript for their trial testimony. Thus, Plaintiffs not only invite, but require
this Court to search the record for the errors that may support Plaintiffs' arguments. "This Court
will not search the record for error. We do not presume error on appeal; the party alleging error
has the burden of showing it in the record." Bettweiser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho at
323, 297 P.3d at 1140.
Again, Plaintiffs simply make a general attack on the district court's rulings without
specific citations to the record, authority, or identifying the evidentiary or legal errors. They do
not identify or explain why the court's denial of their Motion to Limit Defense Proceedings was
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m error. They do not identify with citations to the transcript which testimony by the expert
witnesses was duplicative. Plaintiffs do nothing more than make conclusory allegations that the
court was wrong, the witnesses were cumulative, and they were prejudiced. They also fail to
explain or argue how the defense proceedings affected a substantial right. They do not argue that
the evidence submitted would have been different. They do not argue that the outcome of the
trial would have been different. They just conclude, without any support, that there was a
reinforcement and repetition of each and every defense idea. These assignments of error are too
indefinite and this Court should refuse to hear them.
3. Denial of rebuttal testimony

Plaintiffs also fail to assert this issue with the requisite particularity and support. In fact,
Plaintiffs fail to cite to authority at all. Plaintiffs complain that they were not allowed to call
Dr. Torres as a substitute rebuttal witness. As further evidence of unfairness, Plaintiffs complain
they were not allowed to call a defense expert, Dr. Worst, as Plaintiffs' own expert in their casein-chief. However, there is absolutely no citation to authority to establish the evidentiary or legal
issues involved. The scant citation to the record regarding Dr. Torres's expected testimony is to
his deposition transcript, which was submitted in opposition to St. Luke's motion for partial
summary judgment. This deposition was not brought to the court's attention through an offer of
proof or otherwise at the time it ruled Plaintiffs could not read Dr. Torres's deposition to the
jury. Moreover, there is absolutely no citation to the record to support Plaintiffs' arguments
regarding Dr. Worst.
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Again, Plaintiffs only make a general attack on the district court's rulings with respect to
these witnesses without specifically identifying the evidentiary or legal issues involved or how
and why the court's decisions constitute reversible error. They identify the testimony they
wanted to read from Dr. Torres's deposition, but fail to argue or explain how not being allowed
to read this testimony affected a substantial right.
Plaintiffs also identify what they contend Dr. Worst's testimony would be on causation,
but fail to support that contention with citations to the record. They also fail to argue or explain
how not being allowed to call Dr. Worst affected a substantial right, especially considering that
Plaintiffs had retained their own expert witnesses who were allowed to testify. These
assignments of error are too indefinite to be considered by this Court and should be deemed
waived.
C. The District Court Did Not Err When it Found Insufficient Evidence of a Settlement
Agreement to Justify Dismissal ofEMI and Dr. Franklin
In the event this Court decides to hear and consider Plaintiffs' assignments of error, the
assignments should fail because the district court did not err. Plaintiffs note that they filed a
motion for summary judgment seeking to enforce the alleged settlement agreement, but also
acknowledge that the motion was not heard or ruled upon. The motion for summary judgment
was filed in the morning on August 11, 2014, the first day of trial. (Tr. p. 203, L. 12 - p. 204,
L. 6). The court declined to hear the argument at that time. Id. Plaintiffs' counsel brought the

motion to the court's attention again on the third day of trial at which point the court indicated it
did not have time to hear the motion, but represented that if Plaintiffs' counsel wanted to pursue
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it, the court would take up the motion the next day so that an adequate record could be
developed. (Tr. p. 317, L. 7-25). Plaintiffs' counsel did not pursue the motion further and no
decision was rendered by the court. As such, Plaintiffs waived their motion and there is no
summary judgment decision from which they can appeal.
Even though Plaintiffs fail to discuss it in their Brief, the court denied Plaintiffs' Motion
to Dismiss brought pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) based upon the alleged
settlement. This would be the only decision from which Plaintiffs could appeal involving the
alleged settlement.
Regarding the denial of the motion to dismiss, after the Plaintiffs allegedly reached a
settlement with EMI and Dr. Franklin, St. Luke's was requested to sign a stipulation for
dismissal. Since the proposed settlement terms were unfairly prejudicial to St. Luke's, it refused
to sign the stipulation. In response, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)
asking the court to dismiss the claims against EMI and Dr. Franklin based upon the alleged
settlement. (R. 1415-1416). The court denied the motion because it found that the evidence
before it indicated there was only an agreement in principle and not an agreement on all material
terms. (Tr. p. 182, L. 11 - p. 184, L. 4; p. 198, L. 9-23). The court did not err in denying the
motion to dismiss.
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 41 (a)(2) for an
abuse of discretion. Peterson v. Private Wilderness, LLC, 152 Idaho 691, 694, 273 P.3d 1284,
1287 (2012). This involves a three-part inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the

9

boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Parkside Sch., Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, LLC, 145 Idaho 176, 178, 177 P.3d 390, 392

(2008).
Trial in this case was set to begin on Monday, August 11, 2014. On August 5, 2014, St.
Luke's was informed that EMI and Dr. Franklin had reached a settlement agreement. St. Luke's
was also informed that the terms of the settlement required Dr. Franklin to remain absent from
the courtroom for the duration of the trial, except when testifying as a witness, and that no
representative of EMI or Dr. Franklin could be present in the courtroom. Upon hearing about the
settlement, St. Luke's immediately filed a motion to dismiss on August 6, 2014, arguing that a
dismissal of the tortfeasor/apparent agent necessarily resulted in a dismissal of the apparent
principal. (R. 1373-1385).
On August 7, 2014, Plaintiffs, EMI and Dr. Franklin signed and submitted to the court a
Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice of Dr. Franklin and EMI. (R. 1386-1387). The
Stipulation was brought on the ground that the action between them had been settled. (R. 1387).
St. Luke's refused to sign the Stipulation because the terms of the settlement were prejudicial to
it. Plaintiffs' counsel also submitted an affidavit in opposition to St. Luke's motion to dismiss.
(R. 1388-1401 ). Attached as Exhibit C was a Release signed by Mrs. Morrison. (R. 1401 ).
Both motions to dismiss were heard by the court on Friday, August 8, 2014. St. Luke's
motion was heard first and denied. (Tr. p. 176, L. 7-10). Plaintiffs' motion was then heard.
Plaintiffs' counsel represented to the court orally, and in writing via the Stipulation, that
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Plaintiffs had reached a settlement with EMI and Dr. Franklin. (Tr. p. 177, L. 5-14). Plaintiffs'
counsel confirmed that some of the terms prohibited Dr. Franklin from being present at the trial,
except when testifying, prohibited his counsel from being present at the trial, and prohibited Dr.
Franklin from cooperating with St. Luke's in its efforts to defend Dr. Franklin's care and
treatment of Mr. Morrison. (Tr. p. 177, L. 15 - p. 178, L. 10). At this point, the court turned to
counsel for EMI and Dr. Franklin. Counsel represented to the court that it was their belief a
settlement had been reached. (Tr. p. 179, L. 24 - p. 180, L. 5). However, counsel attempted to
clarify for the record that Plaintiffs' counsel had unilaterally prepared and submitted the Release
without allowing EMI and Dr. Franklin to review it. (Tr. p. 180, L. 11-23). Counsel explained
that the settlement agreement was to be reduced to writing, but the Release submitted by the
Plaintiffs was not that writing. (Tr. p. 181, L. 7-19). The court, concerned that all of the material
terms had not been agreed upon, and concerned about a potential second trial over whether the
settlement was enforceable, took a twenty-minute break so that Plaintiffs, EMI, and Dr. Franklin
could consult with each other and try to work through the settlement issues. (Tr. p. 187, L. 16-21;
p. 191, L. 25 - p. 192, L. 9). Plaintiffs' counsel invited the court to review the email exchange
between him and EMI and Dr. Franklin's counsel discussing the settlement terms; however, the
court declined because those were the issues to be discussed between the parties. (Tr. p. 192,
L.20-p.193,L.14).
After the recess, Plaintiffs' counsel represented that he did not believe there was any
obligation for a written release under the terms of the settlement. They had only submitted the
Release in opposition to St. Luke's motion to dismiss. (Tr. p. 193, L. 16 - p. 194, L. 15). Counsel
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for EMI and Dr. Franklin informed the court that there had indeed been a number of
conversations about needing to reduce the agreement to writing, that her clients were asking for
that, and that the Release Plaintiffs submitted contained a term to which EMI and Dr. Franklin
could not and would not agree. (Tr. p. 195, L. 18 -p. 197, L. 5). EMI and Dr. Franklin's counsel
indicated that this objectionable term was a sticking point that was problematic to settlement.
(Tr. p. 197, L. 2-5). Recognizing that not all of the material terms to the settlement had been
agreed upon, the court found there was no settlement at that time. (Tr. p. 198, L. 9-10). The court
then withdrew its previous denial of St. Luke's motion to dismiss, finding it premature, and
denied Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss. (Tr. p. 198, L. 11-21 ). The court did not err.
Stipulations for the settlement of litigation are favored by the courts and will be enforced
unless good cause to the contrary is shown. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 898, 204
P.3d 532, 538 (Ct. App. 2009). An "agreement in principle," however, has been held
unenforceable where a written agreement was contemplated. Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho
630, 634, 888 P.2d 804, 808 (Ct. App. 1995); see also Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690, 696,
838 P.2d 293, 299 (1992) ("An oral agreement is valid if the written draft is viewed by the
parties as a mere record; the oral agreement is not valid if the parties view the written draft as a
consummation of the negotiation.").
A settlement agreement "stands on the same footing as any other contract and is
governed by the same "mles ai1d principles as are applicable to contracts
generally." Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341, 345 (1959). "A
contract must be complete, definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain
provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty.''
Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983).
"Whether the parties to an oral agreement or stipulation become bound prior to
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the drafting and execution of a contemplated formal writing is largely a question
of intent." Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002)
(quotation omitted). "Generally the determination of the existence of a sufficient
meeting of the minds to form a contract is a question of fact to be determined by
the trier of facts." Shields & Co. v. Green, 100 Idaho 879,882,606 P.2d 983,986
(1980).
The Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Primary Res. Mortgage, Inc., 150 Idaho 664,672,249 P.3d 857, 865
(2011).
Plaintiffs do not explain in their Brief how the court abused its discretion when it denied
their motion to dismiss. Instead, Plaintiffs simply argue that a terrible injustice occurred because
the court ignored the evidence before it, and Plaintiffs were forced to participate in a trial for
which they did not bargain. First, these baseless and conclusory accusations ignore the fact that
Plaintiffs chose to file a lawsuit against three separate defendants. Second, and most importantly,
they ignore the fact that the court had limited and conflicting evidence before it.

It was Plaintiffs' burden to prove a settlement had been reached in support of its motion
to dismiss. However, the only evidence before the court regarding settlement was the Stipulation
to Dismiss, the Release prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel, and counsels' statements on the record.
The Stipulation indicated a settlement had been reached, but did not include any of the terms.
The Release "incorporated" the settlement terms, but did not actually contain any. And counsels'
statements on the record showed there was a disagreement over whether the agreement needed to
be reduced to writing and over the language contained in the Release. "The stipulations [for
settlement] are best evaluated by looking to the very words of counsel and their clients." Conley
v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho at 634, 888 P.2d at 808; see also Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho at
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898,204 P.3d at 538. EMI and Dr. Franklin's counsel represented to the court that they discussed
with Plaintiffs' counsel, and expected, the settlement to be consummated by a written agreement,
that the Release was insufficient, that they did not even have an opportunity to review the
Release before Plaintiffs filed it, and that it contained a term or provision to which they could not
and would not agree.

It must also be emphasized that the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss occurred on
Friday, with trial scheduled to commence the following Monday. The evidence before the court
at that time showed only that Plaintiffs, EMI and Dr. Franklin had reached an agreement on
some, but not all of the material terms. Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that no binding settlement had been reached to justify dismissing the claims
against EMI and Dr. Franklin.
D. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Limitation of Defense
Proceedings
As discussed in section B(2) above, Plaintiffs raise two separate issues under this
heading: (1) their objection to defense proceedings; and (2) duplication of defense experts.
Each issue will be addressed separately below.
1. Defense proceedings
On the morning of the first day of trial, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Limitation of
Defense Proceedings. (R. 1468-1470). Arguing that the only issue for trial was Dr. Franklin's
negligence, Plaintiffs sought an order allowing only one attorney to conduct each phase of the
trial. Id. The court correctly denied the motion. (Tr. p. 215, L. 11- p. 220, L. 5).
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Pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-1603, the trial court has broad powers to provide for the
orderly conduct of proceedings before it. The exercise of such powers is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. See Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 247, 159 P.3d 884, 877 (2007) (applying
abuse of discretion standard to imposition of sanctions under J.C. § 1-1603).
Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, the court did not deny this motion summarily. When it
denied the motion, the court explained that "[t]here are three identifiable legal interests at issue
here put there by pleadings, not by anything the court has done, nor by the subsequent
procedures." (Tr. p. 218, L. 17-20). It further found that while the legal interests of EMI and
Dr. Franklin were aligned, as evidenced by the fact they shared the same counsel, throughout
these proceedings the court did not see that exact same alignment of interests between them and
St. Luke's. (Tr. p. 218, L. 22 - p. 219, L. 5). The parties were certainly closely-aligned, but the
court further explained that there were two separate lawsuits that were consolidated for trial.
These lawsuits were filed separately by the Plaintiffs' choosing and the case had always
proceeded as a "three-way lawsuit." (Tr. p. 219, L. 19 - p. 220, L. 5). Accordingly, the court
gave a reasoned and thoughtful response in support of its denial of the motion. It considered the
relationship of the parties, considered the unity of interests, or lack thereof, between them, and
considered how Plaintiffs pled their case. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied the motion.
Plaintiffs' argument on this issue is long on conclusory statements and short on support.
There are no citations to the record or transcript to support Plaintiffs' contention that:
(1) Defendants insisted that each participate in the trial as if the other party did not exist;
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(2) there were two complete voir dires; (3) there were two extensive opening statements;
(4) there were two overlapping and cumulative cross examinations; (5) there were two arguments
on every contested objection or motion; (6) there were multiple defense experts on questions of
liability and causation that were cumulative; (7) there were two overlapping and cumulative
closing arguments; (8) there was a "piling on" by the defense; (9) the Defendants were "gaming
the system"; (10) there was a reinforcement or repetition of each and every defense idea; or
(11) the Defendants' actions caused the trial to needlessly extend from a five to six-day trial to a
ten-day trial. Plaintiffs fail to cite to any portion of the record to support these baseless
accusations because there is no support to be found in the record. In fact, it is just the opposite.
On the second day of trial, Plaintiffs moved for a mistrial on the same basis as their
Motion for Limitation of Defense Proceedings. The court denied the motion. (Tr. p. 227, L. 1020). On the third day of trial, Plaintiffs once again moved for a mistrial on the same basis. The
court again denied the motion, but explained that while he agreed the Defendants' interests were
closely aligned, the events of the previous week showed they were not identical. (Tr. p. 315,
L. 11; p. 316, L. 22).

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Lojek.
The motion will be denied, but a couple of comments go along with it: One, the
interests of St. Luke's and Dr. Franklin and EMI are closely aligned. I agree with
that. But the events of last week show that they are not identical. St. Luke's is
vicariously liable in this case, and they have, I think, the right to appear and be
certain that their interests are protected. And, in the event there is another
settlement--which is entirely possible between now and the end of this trial--then
St. Luke's has to be in the position to have protected its record because it will be
the one that will be bearing the brunt of the verdict.
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So that tag-team approach, as you say, is, to some extent, a creation of the
plaintiffs' choosing to sue the parties in the fashion that it did and the fact I have
two separate cases. I have a separate case against EMI, then the case against St.
Luke's. They are not in the same case. They are consolidated for trial, but they
have not been--they are still two separate cases.
(Tr. p. 315, L. 11 - p. 316, L. 9). For those reasons, the court again denied Plaintiffs' motion for a
mistrial. However, recognizing that there could be an element of unfairness if the defense
attorneys were able to argue the same set of facts and legal theories, the court put the parties on
notice that it might limit closing arguments in some respect. (Tr. p. 316, L. 11-22).
On the eighth day of trial, August 22, 2014, Plaintiffs' counsel asked the court if it could
give any guidance on closing arguments. The court responded:
THE COURT: That was something that I had meant to discuss, and I'll bring it up
now.
As I have forewarned you, I do think that, one, because of the way this case is
structured and gone, and because of the fact that St. Luke's, in fact, has an interest
in the outcome that they need to protect, it's appropriate for them to participate as
they have. I vvill say that Ms. Fouser has done--I think, has been fairly restrained.
Mr. Lojek, you haven't had quite the double-teaming. She has not covered the
same ground, necessarily, the others have.
(Tr. p. 1449, L. 11-25) (emphasis added). The court specifically found that the Defendants had
not double-teamed or tag-teamed the Plaintiffs during the trial. Nevertheless, the court, for the
first time in this judge's career, decided to limit each side's closing to one hour and had the
defense split that time among them. (Tr. p. 1450, L. 1-13). Plaintiffs did not object to this process
and, in fact, Plaintiffs' counsel said he was fine with it. (Tr. p. 1450, L. 20

p. 1451, L. 3).

The court exercised its discretion within the boundaries of that discretion consistent with
applicable legal standards and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Furthermore, what
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Plaintiffs were trying to prevent with their motion to limit the defense proceedings and with their
motions for mistrial, i.e. the unfair tag-teaming by the defense, did not occur. Therefore, not only
did the court not abuse its discretion, but any error that occurred was harmless. Plaintiffs cannot
show that the court's decision affected a substantial right.
2. Expert witnesses
Plaintiffs also claim the court erred by allowing a duplication of defense experts, but this
was not a part of Plaintiffs' Motion for Limitation of Defense Proceedings. (R. 1468-1470). That
motion pertained only to limiting the defense attorneys' participation in the trial. Plaintiffs also
claim that the court made no evaluation before trial under any rule with respect to the
Defendants' experts. Plaintiffs further claim that once they realized that EMI and Dr. Franklin
were reneging on the settlement agreement, they moved to limit the duplicative experts.
Plaintiffs' claims are not supported by the record.
First, Plaintiffs cite to the transcript (Tr. 106, L. 5) to show they moved to limit
duplicative defense experts. That is true, and that motion was heard by the court on July 16,
2014. (Tr. p. 77, L. 2). That was three weeks before Plaintiffs reached an alleged settlement
agreement with EMI and Dr. Franklin and could not have been brought after the Plaintiffs
supposedly realized that EMI and Dr. Franklin were reneging on that agreement.
Second, the motion heard by the court on July 16, 2014, was Plaintiffs' first Motions in
Limine. (R. 1137-1139). Item 4 in that motion pertained to "Duplicative and redundant testimony
of Defendants' experts." Id On appeal, Plaintiffs take exception to the testimony provided by
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Drs. Rosen, Moorhead, Bass, and Codina. However, Plaintiffs' motion in limine only pertained to
Drs. Rosen and Moorhead. (R. 1143).
Furthermore, the court did not necessarily deny Plaintiffs' motion in limine. Instead, it
explained that there may come a time when the presentation of duplicative expert testimony
would require the court to step in, but it would not be with two witnesses. The court indicated it
would let the defense call two liability experts and if they duplicated themselves, it would be
dealt with at trial. (Tr. p. 106, L. 15 - p. 107, L. 7). This court reviews "lower court decisions
admitting or excluding evidence including the testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of
discretion standard." Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 491, 943 P.2d 912, 917
(1997). "The trial judge is entitled to wait and hear the actual foundation laid at trial prior to
determining whether to admit or exclude an expert opinion." Id. At 492, 943 P.2d at 918.
Moreover, since the court reserved ruling on the motion in limine, Plaintiffs had the burden to
object at trial if they believed the experts were providing duplicative or cumulative testimony.

Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100, 106, 254 P.3d 1, 7 (2011). "Objections to evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal." Id., at 105,254 P.3d at 6.
Plaintiffs argue that both Drs. Rosen and Moorhead addressed themselves to the single
issue of Dr. Franklin's conduct and each had identical conclusions regarding the lack of any
violation of the standard of care. Yet, Plaintiffs make no citation to the record to support these
contentions. The truth of these contentions is irrelevant, however, because Plaintiffs' failed to
object at trial on the basis of cumulative evidence. Dr. Moorhead's direct testimony is in the
record at Tr. p. 1351, L. 14 - p. 1390, L. 22. Plaintiffs did not raise a single objection during his
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direct examination. As further support of the lack of tag-teaming, it should be noted that St.
Luke's counsel had no questions for Dr. Moorhead. (Tr. p. 1390, L. 21-22).
Dr. Rosen's direct testimony is in the record at Tr. p. 1519, L. 4 -p. 1547, L. 17. Again,
Plaintiffs did not raise a single objection during his direct examination. And again, St. Luke's
counsel had no questions. (Tr. p. 1547, L. 15-16). Since Plaintiffs failed to raise any objections at
trial concerning Dr. Moorhead's and Dr. Rosen's testimony, they failed to preserve the issue for
appeal.
Plaintiffs also failed to preserve any issue for appeal with respect to the testimony of Drs.
Codina and Bass. Plaintiffs did not file any pre-trial motion to limit these experts' testimony. Any
ruling from which they could appeal would need to have been raised by an objection at trial.
Dr. Bass's direct testimony is in the record at Tr. p. 1461, L. 18 - p. 1478, L. 5. Plaintiffs raised
four objections, two based on leading questions and two based on lack of foundation; none were
raised based on cumulative testimony. (Tr. p. 1469, L. 5-6; p. 1473, L. 20-21; p. 1474, L. 25;
p. 1476, L. 16). St. Luke's counsel cross examined Dr. Bass briefly. (Tr. p. 1478, L. 11 -p. 1486,
L. 17). Plaintiffs raised no objections during St. Luke's cross examination. Id.

Dr. Codina's testimony is in the record at Tr. p. 1270, L. 7

p. 1312, L. 1. Plaintiffs only

raised two objections during this questioning, both on the basis of leading questions. (Tr.
p. 1304, L. 6-7; p. 1306, L. 19-20). No other objections were raised. St. Luke's counsel
conducted a brief cross examination. (Tr. p. 1312, L. 7 - p. 1315, L. 22). Plaintiffs raised no
objections during St. Luke's cross examination.
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Plaintiffs failed to raise any objections at trial that either Dr. Codina or Dr. Bass were
providing cumulative evidence. Therefore, there is no ruling from which Plaintiffs can appeal
and this issue was not properly preserved. Plaintiffs' objections to this testimony cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.
E. The District Court Did Not Err When it Denied Plaintiffs' Request to Read Dr. Torres's
Deposition Testimony to the Jury and Denied Plaintiffs' Attempt to Use Dr. Worst as
Plaintiffs' Expert in Their Case-in-Chief
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' request to read
Dr. Torres's deposition testimony into evidence
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by rejecting their request to read a few
portions of Dr. Torres' deposition to the jury as a substitute for the rebuttal testimony of
Dr. West who was unavailable for trial. However, the court correctly ruled, as it had previously,
that Dr. Torres's proposed testimony was either cumulative and irrelevant, or inadmissible expert
testimony that was not properly disclosed pursuant to the rules of civil procedure.
This Court reviews "lower court decisions admitting or excluding evidence, including the
testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard." Lanham v. Idaho Power

Co., 130 Idaho at 491, 943 P.2d at 917 (citing Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co. Ltd., 127
Idaho 565,574,903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995)). Even if the evidentiary ruling is incorrect, a new trial
is merited only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties. Id.; see also
I.RE. I03(a); I.R.C.P. 61; accord Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 744, 748-750, 86 P.3d 458, 462464 (2004).
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While the briefing did not make it into the record, the admissibility of Dr. Torres's
testimony was first brought to the court's attention in St. Luke's Sixth Motions in Limine which
were filed on August 19, 2014. This motion sought to exclude certain witnesses Plaintiffs
identified they would be calling that day, including Dr. Torres. (R. 23). A hearing was held on
the motion before the start of trial on August 20, 2014. (Tr. p. 352, L. 2 - p. 878, L. 25). With
respect to Dr. Torres, Plaintiffs' counsel represented to the court that he wanted to read
Dr. Torres's deposition to the jury. (Tr. p. 860, L. 6-14). But, the testimony was going to be
irrelevant, cumulative, and inadmissible expert testimony.
THE COURT: What is Dr. Torres going to testify to?
MR. LOJEK: He's going to testify as to the fact that he used to work in the
emergency room here in the Treasure Valley as an emergency room physician.
And, when he made referrals to a cardiologist or to a specialist; he would state in
the record when he wanted the patient to be seen. I think that goes to the standard
of care which Dr. Franklin neglected here. Also, the fact that the emergency
physicians, the fact the medical record is the way to inform the schedulers as to
the doctor's intent to schedule the patient within 48 to 72 hours.
(Tr. p. 868, L. 15 - p. 869, L. 3).
Defendants objected to this testimony because Dr. Torres had no personal involvement
with the Plaintiffs, he did not treat Mr. Morrison, and his testimony was duplicative of
Dr. MacQuarrie and Dr. Soni. Therefore, his testimony was irrelevant. Furthermore, Plaintiffs
were improperly attempting to use him as an expert witness under the guise of a fact witness
without ever disclosing him as an expert witness. (Tr. p. 872, L. 16

p. 873, L. 11). Plaintiffs'

counsel argued that Dr. Torres was just a fact witness who would be testifying about what he
personally did as an emergency room physician if he wanted patients to be seen within 72 hours.

22

(Tr. p. 873, L. 17-22). In response to the court's question as to why this testimony was relevant,
Plaintiffs' counsel claimed it was foundational "in a sense" and "fits in with the standard of care
opinions that were given by Dr. MacQuarrie." (Tr. p. 873, L. 23 - p. 874, L. 7). However, it was
apparent that Plaintiffs wanted to use Dr. Torres's testimony to show that this is what emergency
physicians should do when they have a patient they want to be seen by a specialist within
72 hours. Id. The court recognized that "[t]he implication is that his practice is the standard of
practice; a la it's an expert opinion in disguise." (Tr. p. 875, L. 1-3). It was also cumulative
because Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. MacQuarrie, read Torres's deposition (Tr. p. 332, L. 3-23),
testified about the standard of care, and testified about his opinion that the standard included
specific directions that the patient should be seen within 72 hours. (Tr. p. 333, L. 2 - p. 349,
L. 19).

The court correctly sustained the objection to the testimony.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection, Mr. Lojek It appears to me that either
it's not relevant, because you're talking about the conduct of a different person on
a different day that has no connection. He neither saw nor heard, apparently, nor
was present for any of the events in this case, which would make him the typical
fact witness. He provided no treatment as a physician, as I understand it, which is
another way that physicians become fact witnesses. He simply--you want him to
testify as to his personal procedure as opposed to procedures in general in the ER.
And that's a matter of opinion. That is his opinion as to what is the appropriate
standard of care. That's essentially what you are offering it to prove, because
otherwise his testimony has nothing to do with the case. And the fact that his
opinion may bolster that of your other expert doesn't bootstrap it in.
So his testimony will not be allowed on that point.

23

(Tr. p. 875, L. 15 - p. 349, L. 19). After the court's ruling, Plaintiffs' counsel requested
permission to submit a copy of Dr. Torres's deposition transcript as an offer of proof for the
record, which was granted. (Tr. p. 876, L. 11 - p. 877, L. 9).
On August 25, 2014, Plaintiffs' counsel again tried to read Dr. Torres's deposition
testimony. He advised the court that his rebuttal witness, Dr. West, was unavailable to testify and
proposed reading Dr. Torres's deposition as substitute rebuttal testimony. (Tr. p. 1453, L. 6 p. 1454, L. 6). In Plaintiffs' Brief, they contend that the deposition was going to be read to the
jury to rebut the testimony of Defendants' standard of care expert witnesses, Dr. Rosen and
Dr. Moorhead. (Appellants' Brief, p. 40). However, Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledged during
trial that Dr. Torres's testimony was not rebuttal, it was the same testimony Plaintiffs wanted to
offer in their case-in-chief.
THE COURT: What is he going to testify to?
MR. LOJEK: He's going to testify as to procedures in the emergency room as a
matter of fact. And he doesn't have any opinion as to whether there were or were
not a violation-THE COURT: This is the same issue--this is the same testimony concerning what
was offered in your direct-MR. LOJEK: Yes.
THE COURT: --case? Okay. I'm on track, then.
(Tr. p. 1455, L. 22

p. 1456, L. 7). It was the exact same testimony, offered for the same

reasons, that was previously excluded by the court. As such, the court upheld its previous ruling
and excluded the testimony again because it was either irrelevant, since Dr. Torres's conduct was
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not in question and he did not treat Mr. Morrison, or it was by implication an expert opinion that
was not previously disclosed. (Tr. p. 1456, L. 20 - p. 1458, L. 2). The court also noted that it was
not provided any evidence to show that Dr. Torres was actually unavailable for trial so that his
deposition could be read in lieu of live testimony. Id.
In their Brief, Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Torres's deposition testimony would have been
used for three purposes: (1) to show communication with patients was very important; (2) to
show that Dr. Torres would put it in the medical record or call someone if he wanted a patient
seen by a cardiologist within 48 to 72 hours; and 3) to show that in December of 2011, it was
important to educate the patient as to what the emergency physician was thinking and why he
was referring the patient to a cardiologist. (Appellants' Brief, p. 40). The district court correctly
recognized that this is expert opinion offered under the guise of a fact witness. The only purpose
for this testimony is to establish the standard of care. However, it is undisputed that Dr. Torres
was not disclosed as an expert witness. Therefore, it was appropriate for the court to exclude his
expert opinions because Plaintiffs failed to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4).
Dr. Torres's testimony was also cumulative. The importance of communicating with and
educating patients was already discussed by Plaintiffs' expert Dr. MacQuarrie and by Dr. Soni.
(Tr. p. 1247, L. 14 - p. 1250, L. 19). It was also irrelevant. He did not treat Mr. Morrison and did
not observe Dr. Franklin's treatment. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the testimony.
Moreover, Piaintiffs failed to make an offer of proof to preserve this issue for appeal.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) requires that when a party is appealing an exclusion of
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evidence, the "substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent
from the context within which questions were asked." Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc.,
150 Idaho 240, 251, 245 P .3d 992, 1003 (2010). "The purpose of this rule is to preserve a record
for appeal and to enable the court to rule on the evidence's admissibility." Id. "This Rule
continues unchanged the long-standing policy that in order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for
appellate review, the party assigning error to the ruling must make a sufficient record from which
an appellate court can adequately determine whether there was error, and also whether the rights
of such party have been prejudiced." State v. Schoonover, 125 Idaho 953, 954, 877 P.2d 924, 925
(Ct. App. 1994). Plaintiffs requested, but failed to make an offer of proof as to the specific
testimony they wished to read from Dr. Torres's deposition. Plaintiffs' counsel only summarized
what the proposed testimony would be. This is not a sufficient offer of proof from which this
Court can determine whether the testimony was admissible. See Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker

Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho at 251, 245 P.3d at 1003. Therefore, the Court should decline to
address the merits of this issue.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' attempt to use
Dr. Worst as their expert witness
Plaintiffs attempted to name a defense expert as one of their causation experts by filing a
supplemental expert witness disclosure shortly before trial. They now claim, without any citation
to the record or legal authority, that the court sustaining Defendants' objection to this tactic was
unfair and was made only to hide the truth from the jury. Nothing could be further from the truth.
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It is undisputed that Dr. Worst was not included in Plaintiffs' initial disclosures. (R. 712715, 790-805; Tr. p. 86, L. 5-9). Dr. Worst was first disclosed as a defense expert in EMI and
Dr. Franklin's, and St. Luke's expert witness disclosures on April 8, 2014. (R. 110-113; R. 315319). On July 2, 2014, Plaintiffs submitted their Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures and
for the first time, disclosed Dr. Worst as one of their expert witnesses. (R. 113 0-1131 ). This was
approximately five weeks before trial and well past Plaintiffs' disclosure deadline. Plaintiffs'
disclosure incorporated Defendants' disclosures related to Dr. Worst and indicated he would
testify about his examination of K.M. and consistent with his report. Id. That same day, July 2,
2014, EMI and Dr. Franklin filed motions in limine (R. 1152-1170) which were heard on
July 16, 2014. (Tr. p. 77, L. 2). In issue "J," EMI and Dr. Franklin asked the court to preclude
Plaintiffs from offering any evidence or testimony regarding K.M.' s alleged conditions following
her father's death, including pseudo-seizures or psychogenic seizures, because Plaintiffs did not
disclose any experts that could establish causation. (R. 1168-1169). This included Dr. Worst. The
motion was heard on July 16, 2014. (Tr. p. 77, L. 2). In the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel
acknowledged that he intended to call Dr. Worst as an expert witness in his case-in-chief. (Tr.
p. 83, L. 23-25). He also acknowledged that Plaintiffs did not disclose Dr. Worst as their expert
witness prior to the disclosure deadline. (Tr. p. 86, L. 5-9).
Again, this Court reviews a lower court's decision admitting or excluding evidence for an
abuse of discretion. Lanham v. Idaho Power, 130 Idaho at 491, 943 P.2d at 917. Whether to
exclude undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(4) is also
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 180, 219
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P.3d 1192, 1196 (2009). "Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in
exclusions of the proffered evidence." Radmer v.Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d
897, 900 (1991); see also Zylstra v. State, 157 Idaho 457, 466, 337 P.3d 616, 625 (2014).
"Moreover, while trial courts are given broad discretion in ruling on pretrial discovery matters,
reversible error has been found in allowing testimony where Rule 26 has not been complied
with." Radmer v.Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho at 89, 813 P.2d at 900.
The court explained its reasoning for excluding Dr. Worst's testimony from Plaintiffs'
case-in-chief as follows:
THE COURT: Because we have rules of discovery and procedure that govern
trials in order to make them fair for everyone. And part of that rule is that, when a
plaintiff brings a case and discovery is propounded to find out what's the basis for
that case, it's up to the plaintiff to produce that evidence as opposed to wait for
the defense to come up with a defense and then try to use the defendant's witness
if the deadlines have passed.
We enforce those deadlines for the reason that they are necessary in order to give
a fair trial to everyone in the absence of something unusual and out of the
ordinary. And I don't see anything unusual or out of the ordinary of requiring a
plaintiff who makes a claim to have that supported by competent evidence going
in, or at least before or ahead of the deadlines. That's why.
(Tr. p. 86, L. 18 - p. 87, L. 11).
The court's explanation and reasoning is well within the boundaries of the law for
excluding expert testimony pursuant to Rule 26. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion.
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F. St. Luke's is Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal
St. Luke's requests an award of costs and fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code § 12-121. An award of attorney fees is appropriate if this Court
finds that the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Kirkman v.

Stoker, 134 Idaho 541, 546, 6 P.3d 397, 402 (2000); Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 449, 797
P.2d 153, 157 (Ct. App. 1990). Such an award is proper where the appellant argued issues that
were not preserved for appeal by proper objection, argued with the district court's findings of
fact, and invited this Court to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Kirkham v.

Stoker, 134 Idaho at 546, 6 P.3d at 402. It is also proper when the appellant does nothing more
than simply invite this Court to second-guess a trial court on conflicting evidence, has made no
showing that the court misapplied well-settled law, or failed to provide cogent argument with
regard to the trial court's exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho at 449, 797 P.2d at
157.
In this case, Plaintiffs failed to preserve their objections to the expert witness testimony
by proper objection, failed to make a showing that the trial court misapplied any law, failed to
provide cogent argument on any issue that the trial court abused its. discretion, and invite this
Court to substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court on whether a settlement had been
reached. Therefore, St. Luke's requests that it be awarded its costs and fees for defending against
this frivolous and unreasonable appeal.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, St. Luke's respectfully requests this Court affirm the
decisions of the district court in all respects.
DATED this /~(A,day of December, 2015.
GJORDING FOUSER, PLLC
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Trudy Hanson ouser- Of the Firm
Randall L. Schmitz - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent St. Luke's
Regional Medical Center, Ltd.
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